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(1988). Section 316(b) cannot be used as a separate basis for imposing
tax if there is no federal taxable income to
begin with. Id. The Circuit Court for Baltimore City affirmed the Tax Court and
held that Ford Motor LAnd Dev. v. Compo
troller, 68 Md. App. 342, 511 A.2d 578,
cert. denied, 307 Md. 596, 516 A.2d 567
(1986) was controlling.
Ford Motor involved a Delaware corporation involved in real estate development
and related activities in Maryland. Ford
sold real property, that it owned in
Maryland, in 1978 and realized a net capital gain of close to $3,000,000 from the
sale. However, between 1973 and 1978,
Ford suffered overall net operating losses
which exceeded, and offset, the 1978 capital gain. Ford realized this after it had
already submitted its 1978 taxes and consequently asked for a refund, claiming it had
no "net income" to be taxed in Maryland.
The Comptroller, on the other hand,
assessed additional taxes on Ford arguing
that Ford's capital gain was Maryland net
income, and therefore taxable by
Maryland under § 316(b) regardless of
Ford's net operating losses. The Maryland
T ax Court agreed with the Comptroller
and affirmed his assessment. The Circuit
Court for Baltimore City affirmed the tax
court. On appeal, the Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland reversed, basing their
decision on statutory construction.
The court of special appeals held that a
corporation must have a "net income"
under § 280A(a) before the capital gains
allocation provision of § 316(b) can apply.
The court determined that the plain meaning of "net income" for a corporation was
its federal taxable income as governed by §
280A. Comptroller Of The Treasury Income

Tax Division v. A merican Satellite Corpora·
tion, 312 Md. 543-44, 540 A.2d at 1149
(1988) (citing Ford Motor, 68 Md. App. at
350·351). Since § 316 provides the means of
allocating
"net
income"
between
Maryland and other states, the existence of
a "net income" is required as a prerequisite to using § 316. Id.
In American Satellite Corporation, the
Court of Appeals of Maryland used a statu·
tory construction analysis, as did the court
of special appeals in Ford Motor, to determine that the meaning of "net income"
was federal taxable income. American
Satellite Corporation, 312 Md. at 544-45,
540 A.2d at 1150. The court of appeals
decided that the appropriate method to
reach the definition of "net income" was
to ascertain the legislature's intent in
enacting the various statutes in question.
Id. at 544, 540 A.2d at 1150. With this problem solved, the court could then determine whether § 316 modifications could

be made even if a corporation reported no
"net income for the year in question." Id.
The court of appeals used the legislative
committee reports to ascertain the legislative intent of the statutes in question. The
committee reports clearly demonstrated
that the purpose of the current tax law,
which was enacted in 1967, was to significantly restructure the earlier tax law and
bring it into conformity with the federal
tax scheme. Id. at 539, 540, A.2d at 1141As was said previously, the court of
appeals also determined that the legislative
intent was for the "net income" of a corporation to be its federal taxable income
plus or minus certain modifications. See
American Satellite, 312 Md. at 545, 540
A.2d at 1150 (citing Technical Supplement
to the 1975 Report of the State Tax
Reform Study Committee (Legislative
Council Of Maryland at 145 (Feb. 1976))).
These modifications were to be specific
additions and/or subtractions to the federal taxable income. The result of these additions and/or subtractions would be the
corporation's "net income." The modifications which were listed in the committee
report corresponded exactly to those modifications listed in §§ 280A(b) and (c). See.
Id. There was no indication in the committee report that the Comptroller's position,
namely that § 316 modifications should be
used when a corporation reported no "net
income," was correct. See American Satel·
lite, 312 Md. at 545-46, 540 A.2d at 1150.
Therefore, the Comptroller was incorrect in trying to read into the provisions of
§ 280A(b) a further addition to the taxable
base from § 316(b)(3). Id. at 546, 540 A.2d
at 1150-51. Consequently, § 316(b) cannot
be used unless a corporation has a "net
income" as defined under the laws of the
United States because there must be something to allocate in the first place. Id. at
547, 540 A.2d at 1151. Hence, ASC only
owed $14,229 in taxes as required by §
280A(b) for state and local income taxes,
and § 288(g) for personal property taxes.
In A merican Satellite, the Court of
Appeals of Maryland concluded that the
"net income" of a corporation is its federal
taxable income as modified by the addition
and/or subtraction of those items listed in
§ 280A(b) and (c). Furthermore, the court
determined that if a corporation has no
taxable income because its in-state capital
gains were offset by out·of-state losses,
then § 316 modifications cannot be used to
assess further additions. Therefore, § 316
modifications can only be used when a
corporation has a "net income."

United States v. Whitehead: RAILWAY
PASSENGER'S FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS NOT VIOLATED BY
CANINE SNIFF OF LUGGAGE BASED ON REASONABLE SUSPCISION
In the consolidated appeal of United
States v. Whitehead, 849 F.2d 849 (4th Cir.
1988), the United States Court of Appeals
for the Forth Circuit held that the expectation of privacy of one travelling by railroad is substantially less than that of a
person occupying a temporary residence,
such as a hotel room. In addition, the court
held that the brief exposure of the interior
of a sleeping compartment on board a
train to narcotics detection dogs is constitutionally permissible when based on an
articulable, reasonable suspicion that the
contraband is contained within the occupant's luggage. In so holding, the court
affirmed the district court's ruling.
On November 26, 1986, ten minutes
before the departure of the morning train
from Miami to New York City, two special narcotics officers assigned to the
Miami station observed the defendant,
Whitehead, arrive at the station in a taxi.
As he emerged from the cab, Whitehead
carefully surveyed the station before entering. Then, carrying a sports bag and a suitcase, he entered the station, where he paid
$403 in cash for a one-way, first-class sleeping car ticket to New York.
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As a result of Whitehead's initial scruticompared to a person occupying a tempony of the station, the police became suspirary home, such as a hotel room. The
cious and questioned the taxi driver and
lower court further determined that
ticket sales agent. They discovered that
because the police had reasonably
Whitehead had been picked up at the
suspected Whitehead of criminal wrongdoing, their canine investigation of his sleepDiLido Hotel, a known meeting place for
drug traffickers, and that he purchased the
ing compartment did not violate the
ticket under the name "W. Tucker."
fourth amendment.
On appeal, Whitehead conceded that the
The officers then approached and quesexposure of this luggage in a public place
tioned Whitehead, who identified himself
to a trained dog was not a search for fourth
as "W. Tucker." When asked for additionamendment purposes United States v.
al identification, Whitehead began to
Whitehead at 853 (citing United States v.
sweat profusely as he produced a pair of
military dog tags. Although Whitehead
Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983». Whitehead
contended, however, that his luggage was
was dressed in a business suit, he had no
not in a public place, but rather in a train
other identification. Whitehead told the
compartment that was the "functional
police he was from New York and had
equivalent" of a temporary home, such as
been vacationing in Miami for two days,
where he had been staying at the DiLido
a hotel room. Id. at 853 (citing Stoner v.
California, 376 U.S. 483, 490 (1964». Based
Hotel. The officers indicated to the defendant that they were in the midst of a narupon this reasoning, Whitehead argued
that the officers could not bring trained
cotics
investigation
and
requested
permission to search his luggage. Whitecanines into his roomette without a warrant, or at the least, probable cause. Id. at
head refused and boarded the train for
New York.
853.
The United States Court of Appeals for
The Miami police relayed the incident to
the Fourth Circuit rejected Whitehead's
the Washington Amtrak police. A comcontentions. The court found that an occuputer search by police revealed that no one
pant of a train roomette has a lesser expecnamed "W. Tucker" had travelled by train
tion of privacy than individuals in their
from New York to Miami, and that "W.
homes or hotel rooms.
Tucker's" reservation on the Miami-New
York train was made only a few hours
The court of appeals relied on several
before its departure.
Supreme Court cases in support of its reasoning. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
The next morning, an Amtrak officer
132, 153 (1925) recognized a necessary difboarded Whitehead's train in Washington
and learned from the porter that Whiteference between a search of a home or
head became ill shortly after the train's
other dwelling where a warrant must first
be obtained, and a search of an automobile
departure from Miami, had not eaten
much, and had left his roomette only brieffor contraband. Id. at 854. The court stated
ly. The roomette had a sliding inside lock
that "[i]n the sixty years since the Carroll
and could not be locked from the outside.
decision, the Supreme Court has consisWhen the train arrived in Baltimore,
tently reaffirmed that the privacy interests
other police officers and drug trained dogs
of individuals engaged in transit on public
boarded. An Amtrak officer, posing as a
thoroughfares are substantially less than
conductor checking tickets, knocked on
those attached to fixed dwellings." Id. at
Whitehead's compartment door. White854 (citing South Dakota v. Opperman, 428
head opened the door, and the officer idenU.S. 364, 367 (1976) and Chambers v.
tified himself as a policeman and asked
Maroney, 392 U.S. 42 (1970».
permission to enter. Whitehead invited
Ready mobility and its potential for
him in, whereupon the officer advised
immediate flight, as well as the governmental regulations surrounding most
Whitehead of the ensuing drug investigaforms of public transportation has lent cretion. Two dogs were brought into the
roomette and alerted the police to the lugdence to the diminished privacy aspects of
public transportation. Id. at 854 (citing
gage. Three kilograms of cocaine were
California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985».
found in the suitcase, and Whitehead was
In Carney, the search of a parked motor
subsequently arrested.
home in a public place was found to be
At trial, the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the
constitutionally permissible. The Supreme
Court held that the motor home was
canine sniff search was denied. In so doing,
within the "automoble" or "vehicle"
the court relied generally on California v.
exception and that a warrant was not
Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985), invoking the
"vehicle exception" to the· warrant • required prior to the search. Carney, 471
U.S. 390-93. Because the motor home in
requirement. Under this analysis, the trial
Carney was both readily mobile and subcourt ruled that an occupant of a roomette
ject to governmental regulations not
has a diminished expectation of privacy as

applicable to fixed dwellings, the court
reasoned that" overriding societal interests
of effective law enforcement justified an
immediate search before the vehicle and its
occupants became unavailable." Id. at 393.
The court of appeals in Whitehead
reasoned that the fourth amendment principles cited in Carney clarified Whitehead's
privacy interests. Based upon this, the
court found that unlike the parked motor
home in Carney, Whitehead's sleeping
compartment was part of a train moving in
interstate transit. The court opined that
Whitehead was a passenger, not a resident;
and while he could not control the train's
direction, its movement interfered with
the officers' ability to conduct a full fledged investigation within their jurisdictions.
Moreover, Whitehead had the ability to
leave the train at any stop, and unlike a
hotel room, he could not remain on board
once the train arrived at its destination.
Whitehead, 849 F.2d at 854 (4th Cir. 1988).
The court of appeals noted further that
railroad travel is highly regulated, and that
passengers in sleeping cars are frequently
subject to ticket checks and other inquiries
by railroad personnel. The court concluded that these types of intrusions, which
necessarily reduce a passenger's privacy
interests, were sufficient to show that train
sleeping compartments are not "homes on
rails," and that an onboard passenger's
privacy expectation is not akin to a person
in his home. Ii at 855.
Whitehead next contended that even if
his privacy expectation was no greater
than that of an automobile occupant,
probable cause must have supported the
canine sniff search of his compartment
under the fourth amendment principles.
Once again the court disagreed, stating
that given the defendant's reduced expectation of privacy, the importance of societal
interest in effective law enforcement, and
the minimal intrusiveness of the dog sniff,
probable cause was not a prerequisite. Id.
at 855.
In support of its reasoning, the court
stated that the fourth amendment does not
protect people from every governmental
intrusion of their privacy, just unreasonable ones. Id. at 855 (citing place" 462 U.S.
at 706-07). In Place, the court ruled that
avoiding the probable cause requirement
for warrants rested "on a balancing of the
nature and quality of the individual's
fourth amendment interests against the
important of the governmental interest
alleged to justify the intrusion." Place, 462
U.S. at 703. Place held that a canine sniff of
luggage was unintrusive, and the brief seizure of the bags for that purpose comported with the fourth amendment if there
was an articulable, reasonable suspicion
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that contraband was contained therein. Id.
708-09.

The court of appeals also relied on Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), which held that
police officers may make limited intrusions on an individual's personal security
based on less than probable cause. The
Terry court based its decision on "the ultimate standard of reasonableness embodied
in the fourth amendment," and subsequent decisions that found limited intrusions were not confined to the "stop and
frisk" situation presented in Terry. Id. at
856 (citing Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S.
692, 699-700 (1981».

By analogizing the decisions of Place and
Terry to the case at bar, the court of
appeals found that the authorities conducted the dog sniff search of the defendant's luggage in a manner similar to that
in Place. The dogs' presence was prearranged, Whitehead's bags were not moved,
the train was not delayed, and the defendant remained free to move about in the
train while the search was conducted. The
court stated in summation that the "brief
entry of the dogs into the roomette did not
breach the security of Whitehead's effects
or entail a significant encroachment of this
privacy." Id. at 856-857.
The gravity of the governmental
interests, the second prong of the court's
analysis, must be shown to be "sufficiently
substantial" in order to justify an intrusion
on fourth amendment interests in the
absence of probable cause. Id. The Whitehead court again relied on Place, which
identified "preventing the flow of narcotics into distribution channels" by permitting investigative stops of suspected
drug couriers as a strong governmental
interest.Id. (citing Place, 462 U.S. at 704».
Based upon the analysis in Place, the court
of appeals found that the facts of Whitehead likewise involved the sufficiently substantial law enforcement interest of
intercepting and preventing drug movement from source to distribution. The
court concluded that the officers' suspicions of Whitehead, the unintrusive manner of their search to verify these
suspicions, and the defendant's limited
privacy interests as an occupant of a train
sleeping compartment were sufficient to
justify the dog sniff without a showing of
probable cause. Id. at 857.
In his final argument in support of his
motion to suppress, Whitehead contended
that the officers did not possess an articulable, reasonable suspicion that his luggage contained contraband. The court
agreed that a reasonable suspicion was necessary before the dogs could be released
inside Whitehead's roomette. However, it
concluded that numerous objective factors

as set forth by the trial court concerning
the defendant's appearance and conduct
provided the officers with the "requisite
quantum of suspicion." Id. at 857. These
factors included Whitehead's presence in
Miami, a major drug source city; his stay
at the DiLido Hotel, a known meeting
point for drug traffickers; his arrival at the
train station just minutes before the train's
departure and his scrutiny before entry;
his decision, after only a two day vacation,
to take a 26 hour train ride at a cost
substantially higher than an airline ticket;
the fact that he had not taken the train to
Miami, at least not under the name of "W.
Tucker"; his failure to supply his full
name; his making the train reservation just
hours before departure; his paying with
cash as a means to avoid presenting identification; his lack of identification; his startled, nervous appearance and profuse
sweating in an air conditioned station; and
the fact that he left his compartment only
briefly probably so that he could remain

with the luggage. The court concluded that
the officers had a reasonable suspicion that
Whitehead was engaged in illegal activity
based upon the entire "mosaic" of his
actions, and piecemeal refutation of each
factor was not what counted.
In dissent, Judge Murnaghan stated that
a passenger train sleeping compartment
was more analogous to a temporary home
for fourth amendment purposes, and
Whitehead's reasonable expectation of
privacy was violated by the canine sniff
search. Id. at 860 (citing United States v.
Chadwick, 438 U.S. 1,7 (1977) and Katz v.
United States, 139 U.S. 347, 361 (1967». In
further support of his dissent, Judge Murnaghan found that the numerous factors
relating to the defendants appearance and
conduct were, even when considered in
totality, insufficient to create a reasonable,
articulable suspicion of criminal activity
by Whitehead. [d. at 862 (citing United
States v. Sokolow, 808 F.2d 1366, 1371 (9th
Cir. 1987) and United States v. Gooding,
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695 F.2d 78, 83-84 (4th Cir. 1982)).
By its decision in Whitehead, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit has held that occupants of overnight train sleeping compartments do not
have the same expectation of privacy as
individuals in their homes or hotel rooms.
Additionally, the court has stated that
where such diminished expectation exists,
the importance of the law enforcement
interests at stake and the "minimal intrusiveness" of the search abrogate the
requirement of probable cause under the
fourth amendment. As a result of this ruling, the court of appeals has not only redefined the privacy interests of individuals
travelling by train, but it appears to justify
the abrogation of probable cause as a prerequisite to a canine sniff search for contraband by endorsing the use of police
profiles to establish a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity.
-Virginia Marino Harasti
Mills v. Maryland: SUPREME COURT
RULES THAT MARYLAND'S CAPITAL SENTENCING PROCEDURE IS
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY MANDATORY
In Mills v. Maryland -.U.S.._ 108 S.
Ct. 1860 (1988), the Supreme Court of the
United States, in a 5-4 decision, reversed a
Maryland Court of Appeals death sentence
affirmation on the ground that the jury
verdict form used was unconstitutional.
Ralph Mills, an inmate in the Maryland
Correctional Institution, was convicted by
a jury of the first degree murder of his
cellmate, Paul Brown. At the conclusion
of the sentencing hearings, the same jury,
using the verdict form provided for in Md.
Rule Proc. 772A, found beyond a reasonable doubt that an aggravating circumstance
had been proven; namely, that the "defendant committed the murder at a time
when he was confined in a correctional
institution." Id at 1871. Equally important, the jury found none of the mitigating
circumstances provided for in Rule 772A
had been proved by a preponderance of
the evidence. Consequently, the jury had
marked "no" beside each of the eight
mitigating circumstances listed on the verdict form. Accordingly, as required by the
Maryland Capital Punishment Statute,
Md. Ann. Code, art. 27 S 413 (1987 Repl.
Vol.), the jury handed down a sentence of
death.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals of
Maryland, petitioner argued that the statute, in conjuction with the jury instructions and the verdict form, was
36-The Law Forum/
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unconstitutional in that jury unanimity
was required to find the presence or
absence of an aggravating circumstance,
but not required to find the absence of any
mitigating circumstances. Therefore, a sentence of death could result in a situation
where the jury unanimously found an
aggravating circumstance, but could not
agree on the presence of any one specific
mitigating circumstance, even if all twelve
agreed that some mitigating factors existed.
R42 at 1865. Conversely, even if eleven of
the jurors agreed to the existence of a particular mitigating circumstance, the failure
of the remaining juror to agree to the same
circumstance may result in the jury marking the verdict form "no" in regard to that
particular circumstance.
The court of appeals rejected this argument, and concluded that the requirement
of unanimity imposed by the statute
applied not only to a finding of the existence of a particular mitigating circumstance, but also to a finding of the
absence of any mitigating circumstance.
The Court found that the verdict form
should be read as requiring unanimity for
"no" answers as well as "yes" answers.
Furthermore, they found that the trial
judge's instructions to the jury stressed the
need for unanimity on all of the issues presented. Id at 1864. Therefore, the Court
concluded that a finding by any one juror
of a mitigating circumstance was sufficient
to compel the jury to weigh this factor
against any aggravating circumstance.

Your

WILL
isa WAY

to vanquish

EMPHYSEMA
and ASTHMA
One sentence inserted by
your attorney"I give and bequeath to the
American Lung Association of Maryland the sum
of doliara to be
used for Its general
purposes."
-can help prevent and care for
lung diseases that cripple and
kill adults and children.

A MERICAN
LUNG
ASSOCIATION

of Maryland, Inc.

1I01 York Road, Lu.hb-i11,.MD 21W9

The Court of Appeals of Maryland recognized, however, that the statute did not
provide a procedure to be followed when
unanimity could not be reached. Thus,
pursuant to its authority to fill gaps in the
sentencing process, as provided by 5
413(1), they directed that if the jury could
not agree unanimously on the acceptance
or rejection of any mitigating circumstances, it should leave that answer
blank and proceed to the balancing phase.
R41 at 1864.
The Supreme Court initially noted the
importance of mitigating factors in capital
cases, stating that "the sentencer may not
refuse to consider or be precluded from
considering any relevant evidence."
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
With this proposistion in mind, the Court
proceeded to analyze "whether petitioner's interpretation of the sentencing process is one a reasonable jury could have
drawn from the instructions given by the
trial judge and from the verdict form
employed in this case." Mils at 1866.
The strength of Mill's argument rested
on the possibility that alternate grounds
existed for the sentence of death. If the
jury adopted the interpretation favored by
the Court of Appeals of Maryland, then it
only marked "no" on the verdict form
when all twelve of the jurors agreed that
the mitigating circumstances were not proved by a preponderance of the evidence.
Id Conversely, if the jury adopted the
approach advanced by the petitioner, then
the marking of "no", only indicated a failure to unanimously agree to the existence
of a particular mitigating circumstance.
Thus, the jury would be precluded from
considering mitigating factors that some
jurors found to exist. The Supreme Court
said, "[U]nless we can rule out the substantial possibility that the jury may have
rested its verdict on the 'improper'
ground, we must remand for resentencing." Id at 1867.
They decided that the two crucial factors to be considered were the judge's
instructions to the jury regarding the verdict form stipulated by Md. Rule Proc.
772A, and the verdict form itself. Regarding the jury instructions, the Court found
that while the trial judge repeatedly stressed the need for unanimity concerning the
finding of both aggravating and mitigating
circumstances, he failed to stress that the
answer of "no" to either one also required
a unanimous finding. Thus, the Court
determined that it was possible that the
jury made the inference that the "no"
answer is merely a failure to unanimously
agree on the existence of a particular circumstance,
either
aggravating
or
mitigating, not a unanimous finding that

